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ON January 4, 1978 the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System, in conjunction with the Exchange
Stabilization Fund, announced that they would inter-
vene in foreign exchange markets to prevent a specu-
lative decline in the international value of the U.S.
dollar.1 This announcement has been happily received
by European and Japanese central banks and has
elicited lively discussion in the news media. The
stated purpose of intervention is to eliminate “specu-
lative” swings in the value of the dollar. But it is
also clear that if such speculation has indeed affected
the value of the dollar, it has been unidirectional
for the past nine months as the international value
of the dollar has been declining steadily and, at times,
precipitously. This has been particularly true with
respect to the Deutsche mark, Swiss franc, British
pound and Japanese yen. Thus intervention in this
article is viewed as the buying of dollars in foreign
exchange markets by U.S. and foreign governments
and central banks.
There have been many assertions with respect to
the issue of intervention. There are those who argue
that U.S. intervention will have contractionary effects
on tile U.S. money stock and will not cause expan-
sionary pressures on the money stock of other coun-
tries. It is also argued that U.S. intervention will
produce a different impact on U.S. interest rates thau
that produced by foreign intervention. The purpose
of this article is to consider the validity of these
propositions by examining the mechanics of interven-
tion in foreign exchange markets. The issue discussed
here is not whether intervention is desirable or
whether it is, or will be, successful. Nor is the purpose
to evahiate what ultimate impact it will have ou
economic activity in the United States and abroad.
The Framework for Analysis
To isolate the impact of foreign exchange interven-
tion on U.S. and foreign money stocks and U.S. in-
terest rates, without getting involved in possible or
probable reactions by fiscal and monetary authorities,
four assumptions are made.
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rage 2
1. The U.S. Treasury deficit is unaffected by for-
eign exchange intervention, Specifically, this implies
that if foreigners buy more Treasury securities than
they did prior to intervention, fe\ver Government
securities will he sold to the domestic sector. It is
also assumed that Treasury deposits at Federal Re-
serve Banks will, on average, remain at the same
level. If intervention increases these deposits, the
increase will be spent or sales of Treasury securities
in domestic markets will decline.
2. Monetary authorities here and abroad do not
undertake monetary actions to offset the impact of
intervention. Thus, if intervention causes domestic
hank reserves to increase, permitting commercial
banks to expand their loans and consequently the
money stock, central banks will not start selling
securities in the open market to reduce hank re-
serves by an equivalent amount.
3. Foreign central banks immediately convert their
dollar holdings (deposits at Federal Reserve Banks)
into U.S. Treasury securities.
4. Cold reserves will not be used for intervention.
The first two assumptions are dictated by the scope
of this analysis. The purpose is to isolate the pressures
that result from intervention, not how governments
react to these pressures. The third assumption is
simply consistent with historical evidence — except
for gold, foreign central banks minimize their holdings
of noninterest-bearing assets. And the fourth as-
sumption arises from current practices as evidenced
by swaps of the type just arranged.
Accounting techniques can be used to demonstrate
tile impact of intervention itself, without consideration
of further repercussions. To trace the financial flows
that result from intervention, the balance sheets of
the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and a
representative Foreign Central Bank, along with the
consolidated balance sheets of U.S. commercial banks
and foreign commercial banks, are used.2 In practice,
intervention in foreign exchange markets can be
undertaken by three distinct institutions: foreign cen-
tral banks, the Federal Reserve System, and the Ex-
2’rhis analysis could be extended to the balance sheets of the
public, but the results of intervention itself would be
identical.
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Foreign Central Bank Intervention
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change Stabilization Fund. This last institution can in-
tervene by using three types of assets: deposits at
Federal Reserve Banks, Treasury Securities, or Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) at the International Monetary
Fund. Thus there are five separate cases to analyze,
three of which are initiated by the Exchange Stabili-
zation Fund.
Intervention by Foreign Central Banks
Foreign central banks can support the value of the
dollar (keep their own currency from appreciating)
by simply creating their own currency denominated
deposits and using them to buy dollars in the foreign
exchange market. Such action increases the demand
for dollars on the foreign exchange market and raises
the price of the dollar in terms of this foreign cur-
rency. This type of intervention was widely practiced
during 1977, as foreign central banks accumulated
upward of $30 billion in dollar denominated assets.
For the sake of balance sheet brevity, the following
abbreviations will be used: U.S. Treasury (UST),
Federal Reserve Banks (FRB), Foreign Central Bank
(FCB), Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), foreign
commercial banks (feb), U.S. commercial banks (cb),
and commercial bank reserves (res).
In Exhibit I, transaction (1) is the process of inter-
vention — the purchase of dollar deposits by the
Foreign Central Bank. We shall assume throughout all
following transactions that sellers of dollars are foreign
commercial banks. This assumption is made for the
sake of simplicity only, and final results would not
be affected if the sellers of dollars were the U.S. or
foreign public. Thus intervention in the foreign ex-
change market means that the Foreign Central l3ank
buys dollar deposits of foreign commercial banks at
U.S. commercial banks and pays for them by crediting
foreign commercial hank reserves. The Foreign Cell-
tral Bank deposits its dollar proceeds at Federal Re-
serve Banks. When this dollar draft is cleared, U.S.
commercial banks lose reserves.
Transaction (2) shows the conversion of Foreign
Central Bank deposits at Federal Reserve Banks into
Treasury securities. It is assumed here that the For-
eign Central Bank buys these securities directly from
the Treasury. If it were to buy them in the open
market, the final impact on reserves amid interest rates
would he identical,1 Thus the security holdings of the
Foreign Central Bank increase, its deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks decrease, and Treasury deposits at
Federal Reserve Banks increase.
Since we have assumed that the Treasury will not
increase the level of its deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks, in transaction (3) this increase in deposits is
used to buy Treasury securities from U.S. commercial
banks, or more likely, the Treasury will simply sell
fewer securities in domestic markets. The results of
such reduced sales are equivalent to transaction (3).
:vI’he purchase of Treasury securities iu the open market would
increase U.S. commercial bank rescues. An increase in the
demand for Treasury securities by the Foreign Central Bank
would produce effects on interest rates identical to transac-
tion (2) where the suppiy of securities was reduced.
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When U.S. commercial banks clear the check from
the U.S. Treasury, their reserves rise.
The net effects of Foreign Central Bank intervention
are that the Treasury has financed some of its expendi-
tures through a sale of its securities to a Foreign
Central Bank, foreign commercial hank dollar holdings
have decreased, the U.S. commercial bank portfolio
of Treasury securities has decreased, and foreign com-
mercial banks have exchanged their dollar assets for
domestic reserves.
Since foreign commercial hank reserves have in-
creased, there is pressure to increase the rate of
growth of the foreign money stock. U.S. commercial
hank reserves have not changed, but since the Treas-
ury has sold some of its securities directly to a Foreign
Central Tlauk. it doesn’t have to sell them in the do-
mestic credit market. Interest rates on U.S. Covern-
ment securities can therefore he expected to be
lower than they svould have been in the absence of
intervention.
Intervention by the Federal Reserve System
Since intervention to prevent the dollar from de-
clining requires foreign currencies with which to buy
dollars, the swap network must he activated. Swap
arrangements permit the U.S. Treasury or the Federal
Reserve to borrow foreign currencies while (in effect)
giving dollar denominated deposits at the Federal
Reserve Banks as collateral. In practice, these deposits
are usually converted into Treasury Securities, pri-
marily of the nonnegotiahle type. The acquired foreign
currencies are then used to buy dollars in the foreign
exchange market.
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In Exhibit II, transaction (1) depicts the acquisition
by the Federal Reserve System of foreign denomi-
nated deposits at the Foreign Central Bank. The
Foreign Central Bank credits the Federal Reserve
account and in return receives Treasury securities
which are paid for by the Federal Reserve System in
the form of a credit to the Treasury’s account at the
Federal Reserve. This transaction does not affect hank
reserves in either countrv. In transaction (2) the
Federal Reserve System buys dollar denominated
deposits of foreign commercial banks at U.S. commer-
cial banks and pays for them with its foreign currency
deposits at the Foreign Central Bank. When the Fed-
eral Reserve payment is cleared, foreign commercial
banks experience an increase in reserves. Meanwhile,
when the foreign commercial hank draft on dollar
deposits is cleared, U.S. commercial hank reserves
decline. In transaction (3) the Treasury disposes of its
increased balance at Federal Reserve Banks by buying
Treasury securities from U.S. commercial banks (as in
the previous case, this transaction is in lieu of a de-
crease in Treasury borrowings in private markets).
This raises U.S. commercial hank reserves.
The net result of this type of intervention is identi-
cal to the one produced by Foreign Central Bank
intervention: foreign commercial hank reserves ex-
pand, U.S. commercial hank reserves do not change,
and there is downward pressure on the interest rates
of U.S. Treasury securities.
lntervention by the Exchange Stabilization
Fund
The Exchange Stabilization Fund was created in
1934 specifically for the purpose of intervening in
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Using FRB Deposits Since the Exchange Stabih
zation Fund has minimal deposits at the FRB, it can
acquire them by selling SDR certificates to the Fed-
eral Reserve and receiving deposits in return (Exhibit
III, transaction (1)). In transaction (2) the Exchange
Stabilization Fund writes a check on its account at the
Federal Reserve Bank and acquires foreign currency
denominated deposits at the Foreign Central Bank. It
then uses this account (transaction (3)) to buy dollar
denominated deposits of foreign commercial banks at
US. banks and deposits these proceeds at Federal
Reserve Banks. This transaction increases foreign
commercial bank reserves and reduces the reserves of
U.S. commercial banks. Since the Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund now has an increase in its balances at the
Federal Reserve, it will use these balances to buy
securities from the Treasury (transaction (4)). In
transaction (2) the Foreign Central Bank accumu-
lated additional deposits at Federal Reserve Banks
and uses these deposits to buy securities from the
exchange markets during the fixed exchange rate
regime. While the Fund is owned by the U.S. Treas-
ury, it is a separate entity with its own financial re-
sources and with its own account at Federal Reserve
Banks. The bulk of its assets consists of Special Draw-
ing Rights and nonnegotiable Treasury securities. The
impact of its intervention depends upon the type of
assets that it uses. If it uses Treasury securities or its
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, then it must ac-
quire foreign currencies in a manner similar to the
Federal Reserve. If it uses SDR, which are accepted
by central banks, it can sell them outright to the For-
eign Central Bank for foreign currency denominated
deposits. Consequently, Exchange Stabilization Fund
intervention will he discussed in three parts: using
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, using Treasury
securities, and using SDR. In these transactions one
additional assumption must be made: the Exchange
Stabilization Fund also minimizes its noninterest bear-
ing assets and holds minimal balances at the FRB.
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Treasury (transaction (5)). Transactions (4) and (5) and a decrease in reserves of U.S. commercial banks.
increase Treasury deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, There would he no effect on Treasury security yields
and the Treasury uses these deposits to buy Treasury since no securities were traded in the market.
securities from U.S. commercial banks (this transac-
tion is again in lieu of selling fewer securities in the However, the asset mix of the Exchange Stahiliza-
future). tion Fund has changed; they have less Treasury secu-
rities and higher deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.
The net effect of this intervention is an increase in If the Fund desires to maintain the same asset mix
foreign commercial bank reserves and an increase in and the same income as prior to intervention, it would
the reserves of U.S. commercial banks. Since the de- activate transaction (3) in which it would buy Treas-
mand for Treasury securities (by the Exchange Sta- ury securities in the market thereby increasing U.S.
bilization Fund) increases and the supply decreases, commercial bank reserves.4 Under these circumstances
these transactions produce a downward pressure on the net effect of intervention would again he an in-
Treasury security yields, crease in foreign commercial hank reserves, no change
Using Treasury Securities — This set of transactions in U.S. commercial bank reserves, and downward
assumes that the Exchange Stabilization Fund sells its pressure on Treasury security yields.
Treasury securities directly to the Foreign Central Using SDR — In transaction (1) of Exhibit V, the
Bank. If the Fund were to sell these securities in the Exchange Stabilization Fund sells SDR to the Foreign
open market or to the Federal Reserve System, and if Central Bank and receives a foreign currency denomi-
Foreign Central Banks were subsequently to buy nated deposit. In transaction (2) it spends this deposit
these securities, the results would be the same. to buy dollar deposits from a foreign commercial hank
In transaction (1) of Exhibit IV, the Exchange and transfers these deposits to Federal Reserve Banks.
Stabilization Fund sells its Treasury securities to the Again, since the Exchange Stabilization Fund keeps
Foreign Central Bank and acquires a foreign deposit. its dollar assets mainly in the form of Treasury securi-
In transaction (2) it uses its foreign currency denomi- ties, it will buy such securities (transaction (3)) and
nated deposit to buy dollars from foreign commercial
banks and deposits these dollars at its account at the 4Jf the Exchange Stabilization Fund were to buy securities
Federal Reserve Bank, which causes reserves of U.S. ~etIyf~t~ U.S. Treasury, it would have increased
commercial banks to contract. Intervention-induced have caused the Treasury to buy its securities in the market
transactions could stop here, and the net effect would
be an increase in foreign commercial hank reserves terest rates identical to transaction (3).
Exhibrt IV
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Exhibit V
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the U.S. Treasury will use these additional deposits to produce expansionary or contractive effects on the
buy securities from U.S. commercial banks (transac- U.S. economy through monetary channels.
tion (4)). The net result of this type of intervention 3. In all of these cases, and assuming no change in
produces an increase in foreign commercial bank re- Treasury expendiwres and receipts, there would be
serves and no change in U.S. commercial bank re- a decline in Treasury securities sold in the domestic
serves. Furthermore, it lowers yields on Treasury market or an increase in the demand for such securi- ties. This would exert downward pressure on U.S.
securities. Treasury security yields.
4. From the standpoint of economic repercussions
Summary and Conclusions caused purely by the acts of intervention, there is
absolutely no difference in whether the intervention
The techniques described above exhaust the most is undertaken by foreign central banks or by U.S.
frequently used methods of buying dollars in foreign authorities.
exchange markets. Except for the case in which the 5. In general, intervention in foreign exchange
Exchange Stabihzation Fund is willing to issue addi- markets to support the value of the U.S. dollar is
tional SDR certificates, there are several results of possible only through the cooperation of foreign
central banks and their willsngness to accept upward
intervention which are common to all the remaining pressures on their commercial bank reserves. At the
methods: same time, as long as foreign central banks keep
their dollar holdings in the form of U.S. Treasury
1. In the ahsence of domestic fiscal and monetary securities, intervention will produce no impact on
policy actions to offset the impact of intervention, all U.S. commercial bank reserves.
intervention to support the dollar will lead to an
expansion in foreign commercial bank reserves, pres- The exception is the case where the Exchange
sure to expand the money stock and presumably Stabilization Fund issues SDR certificates to the Fed-
upward pressure on the rate of inflation in affected eral Reserve and uses acquired deposits to intervene
counthes. in foreign exchange markets. This method produces
2. Under the same conditions the reserves of U.S. an increase in both foreign and U.S. commercial hank
commercial banks will not be affected and will not reserves.
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